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This paper examines whether political professionalization causes ideological incongruence between 
party strata. For the first time ever, this unique study analyzes the internal opinion structure of 5 
Flemish political parties by comparing the ideological preferences of staffers and party members. 
Breaking new theoretical ground, the paper builds on May’s law of curvilinear disparity, literature 
on political professionalization and cleavage theory to predict and interpret (in)congruences 
between staffers and party members. The analysis is based on the combination of original survey 
data collected among the staff of 5 Flemish Belgian parties (N=560) with survey data collected 
among their party members by the MAPP project (N=10.022). Congruence between both groups 
is measured in-depth, covering 7 salient political issues including socio-economic issues, socio-
cultural policies and globalization. The results demonstrate that staffers are mostly congruent with 
party members, with a few remarkable exceptions. As anticipated by my reinterpretation of cleavage 
theory, incongruences are more prevalent among mainstream parties and mostly appear on issues 
concerning globalization. This cosmopolitan bias among staffers is primarily driven by an 
educational – and generational divide with party members. In the future, these educational and 
generational contrasts within parties could fuel genuine disagreements between party strata, 
especially in mainstream parties with old, shrinking membership bases.  
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Political staffers influence how parties put their ideology into practice. As unelected professionals, 
they are hired to support elected elites behind the scenes on a daily basis. Parliamentary aides draft 
legislation (Busby and Belkacem, 2013; Pegan, 2017) and assist MP’s in controlling the actions of 
government. Ministerial advisors coordinate with coalition partners (Maley, 2000) and oversee 
policy implementation by civil servants (Askim et al., 2017). In parties’ central offices, political 
marketeers shape strategic communication towards voters (Tenscher et al., 2015). Despite their 
direct involvement in politics, however, staffers’ ideological preferences have been ignored by 
previous research. Nonetheless, it matters whether staffers share the views of party members 
because they influence how party policies are voiced and implemented. An ideological mismatch 
between the party on the ground (members) and the daily practice at political offices (staffers) can 
cause dissatisfaction among volunteers (van Haute and Carty, 2012; de Vet et al., 2019; Polk and 
Kölln, 2017) and obscure a party’s ideological position among the electorate (Greene and Haber, 
2015).  
To assess the degree of ideological congruence between staffers and party members, this paper 
compares their policy preferences for 5 Flemish (Belgian) parties. Firstly, I assess to what extent 
staffers and party members from the same parties are ideologically congruent (RQ1). Secondly, I 
investigate whether incongruences are more prevalent among specific parties or policy domains 
(RQ2). To address these questions, the analysis relies on a pooled dataset, combining original data 
collected among political staffers (N=560) (Moens, 2020) with secondary data on party members 
collected for the MAPP project (N=10.022)  (Van Haute et al., 2018; Van Haute and Wauters, 
2019). The preferences of both groups are compared on 7 specific policy domains: income 
redistribution, market intervention, authoritarianism, reproductive rights, climate, European 
integration and immigration.  
This innovative paper breaks new empirical and theoretical grounds. On the empirical level, 
staffers’ policy positions and their implications for intra-party politics are analyzed for the first time 
ever. Moreover, this analysis covers a broad range of issues, allowing for a fine-grained comparison 
between parties and policy domains. On the theoretical level, the paper introduces new insights to 
the study of parties’ internal opinion structure by drawing from literature on professionalization 
(Panebianco, 1988) and cleavage theory (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). In doing so, I aim to expand 
the study of intra-party congruence beyond its traditional, one-sided focus on parties’ internal 
hierarchy. Most importantly, I build on earlier critiques of May’s seminal work that argue how 
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internal disagreements might cut across party strata instead of pitting them against each other 
(Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995; Van Holsteyn et al., 2015).  
The results demonstrate the complex, multi-facetted nature of ideological congruence. On a general 
level, the policy preferences of staffers and party members are relatively congruent. However, 
staffers position themselves more progressive or cosmopolitan within specific parties and – policy 
domains. This gap is particularly striking for issues concerning globalization (EU integration, 
immigration) and disproportionally affects traditional, long-established parties. Although these 
incongruences are primarily driven by educational and generational gaps, the contrasts between 
staffers and party members persist after controlling for these socio-demographic factors. 
This paper proceeds as follows. First, I argue why the ideological positions of staffers should be 
included as an integral part of parties’ internal opinion structure. The theory section reflects on 
potential incongruences by drawing arguments from May’s seminal theory (1973), as well as existing 
literature on professionalization and cleavage theory. In the methods section, I explain the process 
of data collection for both surveys used in this study and introduce the 7 policy statements that 
were analyzed and address my operationalization of ideological congruence. After presenting the 
results, I reflect on the paper’s implications for the study of parties’ internal opinion structure and 
the impact of professionalization on parties’ ideological coherence.  
Staffers’ political impact  
The increased presence of staffers in contemporary politics embodies the transformation from 
volunteer-driven mass party organizations to professionalized, capital-intensive politics (Katz and 
Mair, 1995; Farell, 1996; Panebianco, 1988). Empirical studies have demonstrated how increasing 
staff size (Krouwel, 2012; Kölln, 2015) has coincided with dwindling party membership figures 
(Van Biezen and Poguntke, 2014; Van Biezen et al., 2012). According to cartel party theory, the 
accumulation of resources by elected elites (including staff) has marginalized the party on the 
ground, comprised mainly of voluntary activists (Katz and Mair, 2002; Katz and Mair, 1993). In a 
similar vein, it is generally acknowledged that the priorities of staff-driven organizations differ from 
those who are dominated by volunteers (Kreutzer and Jäger, 2011; Ivanovska Hadjievska and 
Stavenes, 2020; Bolleyer and Correa, 2020). Despite a universal acknowledgement of their growing 
importance, staffers’ opinions have not been considered by previous studies of parties’ internal 
opinion structure (May, 1973; Kitschelt, 1989; Norris, 1995; Narud and Skare, 1999; Kennedy et 
al., 2006; Van Holsteyn et al., 2015).  
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The policy preferences of staffers matter because they are closely involved in political 
representation and – decision-making. Those who focus on communication have a direct impact 
on the framing and salience of political issues towards voters (Sabag Ben-Porat and Lehman-Wilzig, 
2020; Dommett et al., 2020; Tenscher et al., 2015). Parliamentary aides prepare the activities of 
MP’s, who voice the preferences of their constituents during parliamentary debates and introduce 
legislation drafted by staffers (Busby and Belkacem, 2013; Wolfs and De Winter, 2017). In coalition 
governments, ministerial advisors are an integral part of the deliberation between coalition partners 
and they coordinate with civil servants for policy implementation (Maley, 2011; Askim et al., 2017; 
Gouglas et al., 2015). Policy experts play a pivotal role during government negotiations, draft  
legislation and flesh out specific policy proposals (Pittoors et al., 2017). Moreover, they often hold 
the pen during the preparation of the election manifesto’s that get discussed and approved at party 
congresses. To ensure that staffers act on their behalf during all of these activities, elected elites in 
parliamentary democracies prefer to recruit their staff among party members (Moens, 2020). 
Although elected elites assume formal political responsibility for the activities of their personnel, 
existing studies show that staffers have a significant impact on political practices. Laube et al. (2020) 
demonstrate how staffers’ informal contributions to policy formulation are actively ‘invisibilized’ 
to ‘uphold the legitimacy’ of formal representation by elected elites. Empirical studies in the US 
context demonstrate how staffers have a measurable impact on various fronts. Firstly, Montgomery 
and Nyhan (2017) show that staffers directly affect the productivity and policy preferences of 
representatives by analyzing the consequences of staff exchanges between members of Congress. 
Secondly, McCrain (2018) observed that connections to political staffers are of great value to 
lobbying firms, even more so than direct connections to elected elites. Thirdly, the descriptive 
representation of women (Rosenthal and Bell, 2003; Johannes, 1984) and Latino’s (Wilson, 2013) 
among staff increases their substantive representation. In a similar vein, Landgrave and Weller 
(2020) have demonstrated that the involvement of staffers in constituency services significantly 
reduces discrimination against racial minority constituents.  
Staffers and congruence  
Studies of parties’ internal opinion structure are inextricably linked to May’s infamous law of 
curvilinear disparity (1973). However, empirical tests of May’s seminal theory have been 
inconclusive at best (Norris, 1995; Kitschelt, 1989; Narud and Skare, 1999; Kennedy et al., 2006; 
Van Holsteyn et al., 2015). While some have argued that May’s theoretical framework should be 
modified (Kitschelt, 1989; Narud and Skare, 1999), others have proposed to abandon it altogether 
to enable a more open study of ideological congruence (Van Holsteyn et al., 2015). This paper aims 
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to join this more open-ended approach by applying new theoretical perspectives to the study of 
parties’ internal opinion structure. First, I discuss why the preferences of both groups may or may 
not be congruent. On the one hand, empirical studies on political staff indicate that they hold views 
similar to party members (Moens, 2020; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017). On the other hand, theories of 
professionalization suggest the opposite (Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995). Second, I 
develop two theoretical interpretations for incongruence between staffers and party members by 
building on May’s law of curvilinear disparity (May, 1973) and cleavage theory (Hooghe and Marks, 
2018).  
The vast majority of staffers is recruited among party members (Webb and Fisher, 2003; Karlsen 
and Saglie, 2017; Moens, 2020). This practice has several advantages for elected elites, including 
the fact that party members generally are unlikely to deviate from a party’s ideological principles 
(Moens, 2020). As staffers are entrusted with tasks that directly affect political representation, 
appointing party members to these paid positions ensures that they will share the party’s political 
objectives. Empirical studies of staffers in Western Europe confirm that most staffers are not just 
party members but highly committed party activists (Moens, 2020; Karlsen and Saglie, 2017). Even 
in the US context, often considered the Mecca of political professionalization, many similarities 
between volunteers and professionals remain (Super, 2009). Due to staffers’ involvement with the 
party on the ground, Karlsen & Saglie (2017) argue that their presence even helps to keep elected 
elites aligned with the preferences of the membership base: “Their attachment to the grassroots 
organisation, as indicated by their local political offices, may also prevent employees from becoming uncritical yea-
sayers for the leadership” (Karlsen and Saglie, 2017: 17-18). From this perspective, staffers can be 
considered as true party soldiers who share the ideological orientations of party members.  
H1a: Congruence thesis: staffers and party members hold similar ideological 
positions. 
In contrast, influential party models suggest that political professionals and party activists take other 
ideological positions because they have different interests (Panebianco, 1988; Katz and Mair, 1995). 
From this perspective, both elected elites and staffers are office-seekers, whereas party activists are 
policy seekers. Echoing May’s infamous law of curvilinear disparity (May, 1973), this argument 
draws a sharp contrast between the political involvement of staffers and party members. As 
activists volunteer for a party during their spare time out of dedication to its policies, they are not 
economically affected by a party’s performance in office. In contrast, staffers’ relationship to 
politics is an economical transaction: they deliver a range of services in exchange for remuneration 
(Katz and Mair, 2009). Paraphrasing Weber, party members “live for” politics whereas staffers and 
elected elites “live off” politics (Weber, 1921). If a party’s loses parliamentary seats or drops out of 
6 
 
government, both elected elites and staffers are at risk of losing their position. According to May’s 
seminal approach, these diverging incentive structures cause ideological incongruence between 
members and elites (1973). More specifically, sub-leaders (members) strongly adhere to a party’s 
core principles while top leaders (elected elites) cater to voters as a matter of self-preservation. As 
a result, staffers’ “needs and concerns for status, security, and even their attitudes towards policies” become part 
of a party’s considerations  (Schlesinger, 1984: 394).  
H1b: Incongruence thesis: staffers and party members hold different ideological 
positions. 
May’s seminal theory argues that political leaders take more moderate positions than party members 
(1973). The underlying causal mechanism is based on two types of incentives: electoral and 
institutional. I argue that the same incentives apply to political staffers. Firstly, electoral competition 
stimulates elites to maximize support among centrist voters. This electoral incentive is a self-
reinforcing mechanism: electoral competition favors ideologically moderate elites, who then focus 
on the median voter to ensure re-election. While Kirchheimer (1966) coined this process of 
centripetal competition as a key element of the catchall party, Panebianco (1988) discussed its 
organizational implications as a key feature of his electoral-professional party. Influenced by these 
seminal party models, conventional wisdom among party scholars stipulates that staffers are an a-
political, office-oriented party stratum. “Professionalization takes place both in the central office-which 
becomes a professional campaign organization-and at the parliamentary party-which will depoliticize into a 
policymaking bureaucracy (Krouwel, 2012: 244)”. Secondly, participation in elected office produces 
more moderate elites due to inter-party cooperation. During their time in elected office, leaders 
engage in deal-making with political opponents. Especially in multi-party systems with coalition 
governments, elites need to forge compromises to get policies implemented. More often than not, 
the details of such deals are hammered out by staffers by coordinating with their peers in other 
parties (Maley, 2011). If this process of institutional socialization moderates the views of elected 
elites, it should equally affect staffers. As a result, staffers from all parties can be expected to be 
consistently more centrist than party members. 
H2a: Moderate elite thesis: staffers hold more centrist ideological positions than party 
members. 
Cleavage theory offers a more fine-grained approach to intra-party congruence as it singles out 
specific parties and policy domains. More specifically, I apply Hooghe and Marks’ work on the 
emerging transnational cleavage (2018) to intra-party dynamics, hypothesizing that staffers are 
more cosmopolitan than members in traditional, long-established parties. Hooghe and Marks 
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(2018) argue that the GAL/TAN dimension (Green Alternative Libertarian/ Traditional 
Authoritarian Nationalist) is transforming the European political landscape. Fueled by 
globalization, a “new cultural divide” (Kriesi, 2010; Bornschier, 2010) between universalist and 
particularist values is increasingly dominating political competition. I argue that this divide does 
not only affect competition between parties, but also fuels internal disagreement. Existing research 
within this framework has primarily focused on the electoral appeal of Western-European social 
democrats (Kitschelt, 1994; Abou-Chadi and Wagner, 2019; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). 
However, Gaasendam et al. (2020) applied cleavage theory to intra-party congruence in their study 
of Flemish social democrats, demonstrating a mismatch between universalistic elites and 
particularistic voters and members.  
The emergence of the transnational cleavage affects parties unequally (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). 
Building on the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), Hooghe and Marks (2018) argue that 
the chronological sequence of cleavage – and party formation is key to understanding differences 
between parties. Traditional party families were formed after the cleavages described by Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967) were established. Hence, these parties arose as the political expression of pre-
existing, entrenched collective identities (e.g. socialism as political expression of the working class). 
Of course, the formation of these traditional parties predates the more recent emergence of the 
transnational cleavage. As a result, the transnational cleavage cuts right across the support base of 
traditional mainstream parties, creating sharp internal tensions (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). In 
contrast to mainstream parties with a moderate position on this dimension, the emerging cleavage 
does not divide new challenger parties (greens, radical right) because they represent more extreme 
positions on this dimension. I argue that internal disagreements on this new cleavage can translate 
into incongruences between party strata because particular socio-demographic groups are 
overrepresented among staffers. In particular, age and level of education are important predictors: 
older, less-educated voters disproportionally lean towards particularist positions (Hobolt, 2016; 
Oesch, 2006). At the same time, staffers are known to be substantially younger and high-educated 
than party members (Webb and Fisher, 2003). Based on this perspective, I argue that staffers are 
likely to have more universalistic values than party members.  
H2b: Cultural divide thesis: staffers from mainstream parties hold more cosmopolitan 





Data and method 
The dataset includes 5 Flemish (Belgian) parties: Christian Democrats, Greens, Flemish 
Nationalists, Liberals and Social Democrats. These cases include parties with larger and smaller 
membership bases, accompanied by various staff sizes. Moreover, the 5 parties included in the 
analysis cover the bulk of the Flemish ideological spectrum, with the exception of the radical right 
party‡, which refused cooperation in both research projects.  
Table 1: Overview of cases 







N-VA Flemish nationalist 32% 40.482 560 
CD&V Christian democrat 20% 44.394 521 
Open Vld Liberal 14% 57.340 417 
Sp.a Social democrat 14% 42.820 192 
Groen Green 9% 8.801 91 
Note: Data reflect the situation during data collection (2018-2019). a: population data provided by parties 
 
The empirical analysis is based on a combination of two sources: the existing MAPP-dataset on 
party members (Van Haute et al., 2018) and an original dataset on political staffers (Moens, 2020). 
MAPP-data were collected through an online survey between November 2017 and August 2018, 
with an invitation being sent to 193.837 registered party members with an e-mail address. Reaching 
10.022 respondents, the survey obtained a response rate of 5%. To compensate sampling errors, 
post-stratification weighting was applied based on population data on sex and age (weighting 
factors range from 0,64 to 4,74). Staff data were collected through an online survey between 
November 2018 and March 2019. An e-mail invitation was sent to 1.781 staffers, followed up my 
an additional reminder to participate in the project. Receiving 560 responses, this survey attained a 
response rate of 31%. Post-stratification weights were calculated based on population data on the 
number of staffers within each party, party face and age category (weighting factors range from 
0,63 to 1,37).  
The questionnaires of both survey projects included identical questions on policy positions. 
Respondents were invited to evaluate policy statements on 7 salient political issues: income 
                                                          
‡ Vlaams Belang (VB), which represented 6% of the Flemish vote during the legislature in which data were 
collected (2014-2019).  
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redistribution, market intervention, authoritarianism, reproductive rights, climate, EU integration 
and immigration. Responses were structured as 5-point Likert scales (1= Strongly agree, 2= Agree, 
3= Neither agree nor disagree, 4= Disagree, 5= Strongly disagree). Within each party, the 
evaluation of these policy statements among party members and staffers will be compared to 
measure their ideological congruence.  
Table 2: Policy statements  
Income redistribution Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people. 
Market intervention The government should abstain from intervening in the economy. 
Authoritarianism People who break the law should be given tougher sentences. 
Reproductive rights Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion. 
Climate Stronger measures should be taken to protect the environment. 
European integration Our country on balance has benefited from being a member of the EU. 
Immigration Immigrants should be required to adapt to the customs of this country. 
 
As the aim is to measure the ideological similarities between two groups, this type of congruence 
should be analyzed as a many-to-many relationship (Golder and Stramski, 2010). As pointed out 
by Golder and Stramski (2010), this implies that the distributions of both groups on the ideological 
spectrum should be an integral part of the analysis. To grasp the full scope of this type of 
congruence, the empirical analysis examines both the degree of overlap between members and 
staffers and their respective ideological positions. Firstly, the degree of overlap (0% to 100%) 
between members and staffers was calculated for each policy domain within each party. This value 
was obtained by calculating the total sum of the proportion of members and staffers with an 
identical response for each response category (totally disagree to totally agree) on a particular policy 
domain. Hence, I operationalize the degree of ideological overlap between political staffers and 
party members within a certain policy domain as: 
∑ 1 − (
1
2




where n is the number of categories on the Likert scale (1 to 5) and P staffi and P membersi refer 
to the proportion of staffers and party members within category ‘i’. This operationalization results 
in a value between 0% (total incongruence) and 100% (total congruence). To illustrate this degree 
of ideological overlap, the distributions of both groups have also been visualized (Figure 1; 
Appendix A). Secondly, the positions of members and staffers are analyzed through a pairwise 
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means comparison to identify the particular policy domains and parties opinions with significant 
differences. This particular approach is based on the work of Gaasendam et al. (2020), who studied 
ideological congruence among the Flemish social democrats. To facilitate the interpretation of 
these ideological positions, values were recoded so that lower values correspond to leftist, 
progressive or cosmopolitan positions and vice versa. 
Lastly, multiple logistic regression models were estimated on each policy domain to analyze which 
factors explain incongruences between members and staffers. As the distribution of the dependent 
variables (ideological position) are not normally distributed, variables were recoded into dummies, 
with 1 indicating a leftist, progressive or cosmopolitan position. The three main independent 
variables of interest are age (18-35, 36-50 or 50+), education (no higher education, higher non-
college or college) and relationship to the party (member or staffer). The models control for party 
affiliation (party family), which is expected to be the main predictor of the ideological position of 
respondents. Lastly, sex was added to control for the potentially diverging preferences among male 
and female respondents (e.g. reproductive rights).  
Results 
To assess the ideological overlap between staffers and party members (RQ1), I examine the 
similarities between both groups for 7 separate policy domains (income redistribution, market 
intervention, reproductive rights, authoritarianism,  climate, EU integration and immigration). For 
each policy domain, the preferences of staffers and party members within each party are compared 
visually (Figure 1; Appendix A) and mathematically (Table 3). To illustrate the differences between 
congruence and internal (dis)agreement, Figure 1 shows several typical examples of how the 
preferences of staffers and members can be related. Closer examination of these plots demonstrates 
two important points. Firstly, congruence is attainable without internal agreement. Congruence just 
means that the distribution of preferences among staffers and members is similar. However, 
internal agreement is only attained when preferences cluster around the same position. For 
example, the greens are relatively unanimous in their support for market intervention (agreement) 
and the distribution of preferences of staffers and members is very similar (congruence). In 
contrast, the liberal party contains both supporters and opponents of market intervention 
(disagreement). Nonetheless, congruence between staffers and members is high because both 
wings are represented equally in both party strata. Secondly, a lower degree of congruence can be 
the outcome of either diverging positions or the result of more pronounced support for a position. 
For example, social democratic staffers cluster around the center on migration while most members 
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prefer a closed position on this issue (diverging position). In contrast, the slight lean towards the 
right among Christian democratic staffers is significantly more outspoken among members.  
Figure 1: Ideological overlap between staffers and party members 
 
  
    Market Intervention: Greens (Overlap: 91%)        Market Intervention: Liberals (Overlap: 92%)      
   
Immigration: Social Democrats (Overlap: 73%)     Immigration: Christ. Democrats (Overlap: 60%) 
 
Note: Distribution of staffers (dark) and party members (light), scale: from left/cosmopolitan to right/particularist 
 
In general, the results show that staffers and party members mostly take similar positions. 
Congruence ranges between 97% (Greens on climate) and 60% (Christian democrats on 
immigration), rarely dropping below the 75% threshold (Table 3). However, the degree of overlap 
is considerably lower for specific parties and policy domains. More specifically, ideological 
congruence is lower in traditional parties (Christian democrats, liberals, social democrats) and 














Income redistribution 89% 90% 90% 88% 86% 
Market Intervention 91% 76%  75%  92% 94% 
Reproductive rights 83% 76% 85%   75%  89% 
Authoritarianism 77% 92% 91%  84% 93% 
Climate 97% 89% 91% 90% 89% 
European Integration 81% 89% 80%  72%   81%  
Immigration 71%  73%  60%   71%  81% 
   Note: marked values ≤75%  
 
What specific direction do these incongruences take (RQ2)? A pairwise comparison of the mean 
positions of both groups demonstrates that staffers consistently position themselves to the left of 
party members (Table 4). This pattern is most notable among traditional party families and for 
issues concerning globalization. Staffers are significantly more open to immigration than party 
members in all parties included in the analysis. This ideological contrast is most striking among 
Christian democrats and liberals: the distance between staffers and party members covers 
approximately 25% of the maximum distance. Similarly, European integration reflects the more 
cosmopolitan views of staffers: support for European integration is significantly stronger among 
staffers than among party members in all but two parties (greens, social democrats).  
The positions of staffers and members are the most congruent on classic socio-economic issues 
(market intervention, income redistribution). Support for income redistribution is equal among 
staffers and members within all parties. On the question of market intervention, however, both 
social democratic and Christian democratic staffers are significantly more interventionist than party 
members. On socio-cultural issues (reproductive rights, authoritarianism, regionalism), results are 
comparable. Only Christian democratic staffers consistently position themselves more progressive 
than party members on these policy domains.  
The observed ideological incongruences should be interpreted carefully. Staffers are by no means 
a cohesive group of cosmopolitan leftists. Their positions largely reflect party competition in 
general, clustering into three (left – center – and right block) or two groups (left – and right block),  
on most issues (Table 4). However, the picture is more complicated for the most divisive issue of 


































Income redistribution 1,67 1,9  1,72 1,85  2,53 2,54  3,26 3,35  3,39 3,26 
Market intervention 1,83 2,05     1,73 *    2,28 *     1,98 *    2,47 *  2,85 2,89  2,75 2,7 
Reproductive rights 1,17 1,47  1,31 1,41     2,04 *    2,27 *  1,24 1,46  1,65 1,82 
Authoritarianism 3,1 3,01  3,37 3,45     3,36 *    3,65 *  3,63 3,8  4,09 4,12 
Climate 1,14 1,23  1,45 1,65  1,91 1,97  2,02 2,16  1,99        2,1 
EU integration 1,74 1,97  1,99 2,26     1,77 *    2,24 *     1,69 *    2,31 *     2,29 *     2,61 * 
Immigration   2,32 *    2,96 *     2,97 *    3,54 *     3,16 *    4,07 *     3,44 *    4,19 *     4,36  *    4,59 * 
N 29 1139  54 2414  162 2194  134 247  181 4002 
Note: Values represent mean positions of groups (1= left/progressive/cosmopolitan, 5= right/conservative/particularist). *: significant difference between staffers and party members. N refers to item 





democrats, liberals) hold centrist positions that are not shared by the more particularist positions 
of members. Despite these incongruences, the mean positions of staffers and members of the same 
party are never at the opposite side of the political spectrum. Even on the most divisive issues, 
incongruence is limited to how strongly they lean towards the left or right side of the scale. In 
short, staffers roughly align with members but lean towards the more progressive and cosmopolitan 
wing of their party.  
Should these descriptive incongruences between staffers and members be considered genuine 
disagreements between party strata? To evaluate whether the contrasts between their preferences 
are indeed substantial, 7 multiple logistic regressions were estimated explaining which respondents 
hold more progressive/cosmopolitan positions (Table 5). As such, the models test the robustness 
of the descriptive findings by introducing other key factors to explain a person’s policy preferences 
(party affiliation, socio-demographic). Not surprisingly, party affiliation by far has the strongest 
impact on policy preferences among staffers and party members. Party-related estimates 
consistently exceed socio-demographic factors and the difference between staffers and party 
members. More surprisingly, the models demonstrate that socio-demographic factors are the main 
drivers of intra-party disagreement. On most issues, a college degree is the strongest predictor of 
holding a more progressive/cosmopolitan position. Similarly, generational differences are more 
consequential than the contrast between staffers and members. Nonetheless, staffers do remain 
significantly more progressive/cosmopolitan on several issues after controlling for party affiliation 
and socio-demographic factors. The strongest effect can be observed on immigration: staffers are 
more than twice as likely as party members to hold a cosmopolitan position. Staffers are also more 
likely to support climate policies, reproductive rights and European integration. Surprisingly, 
staffers are more repressive on authoritarianism issues. Although this contrast does not occur 
descriptively (Table 4), it does arise once the strong educational differences between both groups 
are controlled for.  
The results demonstrate that the preferences of staffers and members are mostly congruent. 
Regardless of the method applied to assess congruence between both groups, policy preferences 
are convincingly coherent in most parties. The strong impact of party affiliation partially supports 
the congruence thesis (H1a), as staffers and party members mostly hold similar ideological 
positions. Despite their different relationship to political parties, the incongruence thesis (H1b) 
does not seem to hold: the preferences of staffers and members do not diverge consistently in all 
cases. However, the preferences of staffers and party members are no perfect match either. 
Incongruence follows a distinct pattern: some parties and policy domains are clearly more prone 
to disagreements.  Ideological mismatches between staffers and members  are more prevalent in  
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    1,05 (0,11) 
          
    0,93 (0,10) 
        
    1,36 (0,15) * 
 
   0,43 (0,18) *** 
 
  1,67 (0,14) *** 
    
   1,34 (0,11) * 
     
    2,05 (0,14) *** 
Age (ref.: 50+) 
    18-35     
    36-50 
 
    0,85 (0,09) ° 
    0,88 (0,07) ° 
 
1,31 (0,08) ** 
  1,51 (0,06) *** 
 
1,67 (0,12) *** 
1,35 (0,08) *** 
 
   1,06 (0,11) 
   1,16 (0,08) ° 
 
  1,04 (0,11)  
  1,21 (0,08) * 
 
1,55 (0,09) *** 
   1,08 (0,07)  
 
  2,18 (0,10) *** 
  1,55 (0,09) *** 
Education  
(ref.: No higher education) 
    Higher non-college 
    College 
 
 
    0,79 (0,06) *** 
    0,96 (0,06)  
 
 
  1,50 (0,05) *** 
  2,23 (0,05) *** 
 
 
    0,94 (0,07)    
    0,89 (0,07) 
 
 
1,58 (0,08) *** 
2,64 (0,08) *** 
 
 
  1,19 (0,06) ** 
  1,13 (0,07) ° 
 
 
1,62 (0,05) *** 
3,93 (0,06) *** 
 
 
  1,43 (0,09) *** 
  2,31 (0,09) *** 
Party  
(ref.: Flemish Nationalists) 
    Greens 
    Social democrats 
    Christian democrats 




15,97 (0,09) *** 
16,16 (0,07) *** 
  3,57 (0,05) *** 
    0,84 (0,13)  
 
 
   3,41 (0,08) *** 
   2,28 (0,05) *** 
   1,89 (0,05) *** 
   0,66 (0,11) *** 
 
 
2,73 (0,12) *** 
3,84 (0,10) *** 
0,43 (0,06) *** 
2,49 (0,20) *** 
 
 
6,90 (0,10) *** 
4,03 (0,09) *** 
2,68 (0,10) *** 
2,56 (0,19) *** 
 
 
11,28 (0,18) *** 
  3,01 (0,08) *** 
  1,36 (0,06) *** 
   0,92 (0,13)  
 
 
3,15 (0,08) *** 
2,08 (0,06) *** 
2,40 (0,06) *** 
1,78 (0,12) *** 
 
 
40,94 (0,16) *** 
24,22 (0,16) *** 
  6,79 (0,17) *** 
  5,32 (0,24) *** 
Female   0,82 (0,05) *** 0,89 (0,05) * 1,52 (0,07) ***     0,84 (0,07) *    1,08 (0,06)  0,50 (0,05) ***     0,96 (0,07)  
Constant    0,41 (0,05) *** 0,62 (0,05) * 3,93 (0,06) ***  0,03 (0,09) ***    2,60 (0,05) *** 0,65 (0,05) ***   0,01 (0,16) *** 
Nagelkerke’s R² 0,34 0,10 0,14 0,12 0,09           0,16          0,28 
 
Note: Odd’s ratios (SE’s) of multiple logistic regressions; ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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mainstream parties and on issues concerning globalization. When such incongruences occur, 
staffers position themselves more progressive or cosmopolitan than members. This observation 
aligns with the cultural divide thesis (H2b), which stated that staffers are more cosmopolitan than 
party members on issues concerning globalization. In contrast, the results offer little support for 
the moderate elite thesis (H2a), which expected staffers to be more moderate than members. 
I argue that cleavage theory can expand the study of intra-party congruence beyond May’s classic 
hierarchical approach (1973). Most importantly, it offers an alternative explanation for how and 
why the preferences of party strata diverge. Firstly, the cultural divide thesis accurately predicts that 
mainstream parties are more divided and that issues of globalization are more divisive. Secondly, 
the impact of educational and generational differences nuances the apparent ideological contrasts 
between staffers and members. In fact, the models show that ideological incongruence between 
staffers and party members is primarily driven by staffers’ comparatively higher level of education 
and their younger age. In this sense, the positions of staffers amplify pre-existing cleavages between 
different types of party members (young vs. old, lower – vs. higher-educated). Indeed, this is the 
case for policy domains such as immigration, reproductive rights and European integration. In 
contrast, the main cleavage on climate lies between staffers and party members. However, the 
ideological overlap between both groups is so high on climate that this can hardly be considered a 
substantial disagreement (Table 3).  
Conclusion 
The professionalization of politics has led to the emergence of a new party stratum: professional 
staff. While their increased presence in parties’ central and public offices is relatively well-
documented (Katz and Mair, 2002; Krouwel, 2012; Kölln, 2015), this unelected elite remains 
chronically under-researched (Webb and Keith, 2017). In spite of their daily involvement in politics, 
their political preferences have never before been considered. This is especially surprising as 
evidence of their impact on politics is growing (Laube et al., 2020; Montgomery and Nyhan, 2017; 
McCrain, 2018). For the first time ever, this innovative paper examines the ideological congruence 
of parties by comparing their policy preferences to those of party members. The empirical analysis 
relies on a pooled data-set of 5 Flemish parties combining pre-existing data on 10.022 party 
members (Van Haute and Wauters, 2019) with original data on 560 staffers (Moens, 2020). 
Covering a broad range of salient issues, this in-depth study examines how staffers and members 
think about income redistribution, market intervention, authoritarianism, reproductive rights, 
climate, European integration and immigration. Results show that congruence between staffers and 
members in Flanders is generally high. Although parties often cover a sizeable range of the 
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ideological spectrum, both party strata equally reflect this diversity of opinions in most cases. The 
ideological overlap between staffers and party members rarely drops below 75%. These 
observations confirm that Flemish parties prefer to recruit loyal party members for paid staff 
positions (Moens, 2020). In some instances, however, staffers disproportionately lean towards the 
more progressive or cosmopolitan wing of their party. This systematic, cosmopolitan bias follows 
a distinct pattern, as it mostly occurs in mainstream parties and often concerns globalization.  
Although this paper builds on May’s seminal work on intra-party dynamics (1973), it encountered 
several limitations raised by earlier critiques of the law of curvilinear disparity (Kitschelt, 1989; 
Norris, 1995; Van Holsteyn et al., 2015). Following the suggestion of Van Holsteyn et al. (2015) to 
develop a “more open study of the opinion structure of parties”, this paper overcame these limitations by 
applying recent insights from cleavage theory (Hooghe and Marks, 2018). Two particular critiques 
of May’s law of curvilinear disparity resurfaced here: my empirical observations cast doubt on a) 
its claims to universal applicability and b) its one-sided focus on hierarchical disagreements.  
Firstly, Kitschelt (1989) already argued why May’s predictions would only materialize under specific 
conditions. In a similar vein, this study illustrates that incongruence only occurs in some parties 
and on some issues. In this case, cleavage theory explains why mainstream parties are more divided 
and why globalization is so divisive. According to Hooghe and Marks (2018), mainstream parties 
are divided on globalization because they were founded long before the emergence of the 
transnational cleavage. As the increasingly dominant “cultural divide” between universalists and 
particularists sets in motion a process of realignment, this new cleavage cuts right across the 
support base of long-established parties. In contrast, challenger parties (greens, radical right) hold 
unambiguous positions on globalization because they entered political competition during the 
emergence of the transnational cleavage. Of course, the impact of this new cleavage could not be 
foreseen by May’s theory. It was developed in an era when mainstream parties dominated electoral 
competition, which was structured along one dominant socio-economical dimension. Admittedly, 
the cosmopolitan bias of staffers goes beyond the expectations of cleavage theory. While cleavage 
theory anticipates disagreement on globalization in mainstream parties, staffers are also more 
cosmopolitan than members in newer parties (greens on immigration, Flemish nationalists on EU 
integration). Moreover, Christian democratic staffers are also more progressive than members on 
more classic policy domains (market intervention, reproductive rights, authoritarianism). This is 
especially notable for CD&V, as it self-identifies as a political formation that transcends cleavages.  
Secondly, Kitschelt (1989) and Norris (1995) have argued that May’s theory wrongfully assumes 
that party strata are ideological monoliths. Curvilinear disparity exclusively focuses on hierarchical 
conflicts between leaders and followers, remaining blind to fault lines that cut across party strata. 
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This paper shows that a one-sided focus on party strata (staff vs. members) would obscure more 
important drivers of intra-party disagreement. In line with earlier observations among voters 
(Hobolt, 2016; Oesch, 2006), it demonstrates that education and age are key determinants 
explaining an individual’s position on the transnational cleavage. When it comes to their ideological 
preferences, party members with a college degree have more in common with highly educated 
staffers than with lower-educated fellow members. This alternative explanation for incongruence 
puts the apparent division between staffers and members into perspective. Rather a than creating 
a genuine internal cleavage between professionals and volunteers, professionalization amplifies 
existing disagreements because staffers are often young and highly educated. That being a said, it 
is striking that the more progressive/cosmopolitan preferences of staffers persist after controlling 
for the educational and generational gap with party members. Future research could examine 
whether this can be explained by staffers’ distinct occupational background, another central 
determinant of political preferences (Kriesi et al., 2006; Oesch and Rennwald, 2018). 
Of course, the observations in this paper remain limited to the Flemish case. From a systemic 
perspective, curvilinear disparity is unlikely in the Belgian case because its institutional setting 
fosters tightly organized parties (Deschouwer, 2009). As a historically divided society, however, 
even internal disagreements along traditional cleavages (e.g. Christian democrats) are not especially 
surprising. Furthermore, the strong politicization of immigration since the emergence of the radical 
right in the 1990s (Dancygier and Margalit, 2020) could have supercharged the divisiveness of this 
issue within Flemish parties. However, Belgium shares both of these characteristics with plenty 
other European nations. For this reason, I am confident that similar patterns can be expected in 
other European parliamentary democracies with established party systems. 
The findings signal that professionalization has potential real-world implications for party 
cohesion. For now, professionalization is not the main driver of intra-party disagreement. Rising 
tensions between groups of supporters with contrasting generational and educational backgrounds 
are a more likely source of internal conflicts. Yet parties should be mindful that staffers do not 
reflect the views of the party on the ground – even when the vast majority of them is recruited 
among a party’s membership base. As parties will likely continue selecting young and highly 
educated members for staff positions, educational and generational divides could indeed crystallize 
along party strata in the future. This risk is especially pressing in traditional mass membership 
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Appendix A. Ideological overlap 
Income Redistribution  
 Overlap 
 Staff  Members  
 







Social Democrats 90% 
 
1,72 0,79 1,85 0,79 



















Figures: Distribution of staff (dark) and party members (light); Left = support for income 
redistribution, Right = opposition to income redistribution 
    
Greens      Social Democrats 
   





 Staff  Members  
 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD  
Greens 91%  1,83 0,76  2,05 0,88  
Social Democrats 76%  1,73 0,85  2,28 1,05  
Christian Democrats 75%  1,98 0,61  2,47 0,91  
Liberals  92%  2,85 1,02  2,89 1,06  
Flemish Nationalists 94%  2,75 0,97  2,70 0,98  
 
Figures: Distribution of staff (dark) and party members (light); Left = support for market 
intervention, Right = opposition to market intervention 
   
Greens     Social Democrats 
   





 Staff  Members  
 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD  
Greens 77%  1,17 0,45  1,47 0,70  
Social Democrats 92%  1,31 0,56  1,41 0,68  
Christian Democrats 91%  2,04 0,96  2,27 1,03  
Liberals  84%  1,24 0,49  1,46 0,69  
Flemish Nationalists 93%  1,65 0,85  1,82 0,97  
 
Figures: Distribution of staff (dark) and party members (light); Left = support for reproductive 
rights, Right = opposition to reproductive rights 
   
Greens     Social Democrats 
   






 Staff  Members  
 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD  
Greens 86%  3,10 0,71  3,01 0,91  
Social Democrats 76%  3,37 0,67  3,45 1,00  
Christian Democrats 79%  3,36 0,79  3,65 0,94  
Liberals  86%  3,63 0,85  3,80 0,98  
Flemish Nationalists 90%  4,12 0,70  4,09 0,90  
 
Figures: Distribution of staff (dark) and party members (light); Left = opposition to 
authoritarianism, Right =support for authoritarianism 
   
Greens     Social Democrats 
    






 Staff  Members  
 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD  
Greens 97%  1,14 0,35  1,23 0,67  
Social Democrats 89%  1,45 0,64  1,65 0,79  
Christian Democrats 91%  1,91 0,74  1,97 0,84  
Liberals  90%  2,02 0,72  2,16 0,80  
Flemish Nationalists 89%  1,99 0,72  2,10 0,85  
 
Figures: Distribution of staff (dark) and party members (light); Left = support for climate 
policies, Right = opposition to climate policies 
    
Greens      Social Democrats 
    






 Staff  Members  
 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD  
Greens 81%  1,74 0,87  1,97 0,85  
Social Democrats 89%  1,99 0,88  2,26 0,95  
Christian Democrats 80%  1,77 0,68  2,24 0,93  
Liberals  72%  1,69 0,82  2,31 0,99  
Flemish Nationalists 81%  2,29 0,75  2,61 0,99  
 
Figures: Distribution of staff (dark) and party members (light); Left = support for European 
Integration, Right = opposition to European Integration 
   
Greens     Social Democrats 
   






 Staff  Members  
 
 Mean  SD  Mean  SD  
Greens 71%  2,32 0,88  2,96 0,98  
Social Democrats 73%  2,97 1,01  3,54 1,06  
Christian Democrats 60%  3,16 0,93  4,07 0,85  
Liberals  71%  3,44 1,05  4,19 0,89  
Flemish Nationalists 81%  4,36 0,68  4,59 0,65  
 
Figures: Distribution of staff (dark) and party members (light); Left = support for Immigration, 
Right = opposition to Immigration 
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Flemish Nationalists  
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Appendix C. Regression models 




































Relation to party        
(ref.: Party member)        
   Unaffiliated staff     1,30 (0,29)   2,93 (0,35) **      2,10 (0,48)     0,87 (0,40)   2,43 (0,44) *    1,17 (0,32)     1,24 (0,41) 
   Party-affiliated staff  
 
    1,02 (0,12) 0,79 (0,11) *      1,29 (0,16) ° 0,38 (0,20) ***   1,56 (0,15) **    1,35 (0,13) *   2,11 (0,15) *** 
Age (ref.: 50+) 
    18-35     
    36-50 
 
 
    0,85 (0,09) ° 
    0,88 (0,07) ° 
 
1,31 (0,08) ** 
  1,52 (0,06) *** 
 
1,67 (0,12) *** 
1,36 (0,08) *** 
 
   1,06 (0,11) 
   1,16 (0,08) ° 
 
  1,03 (0,11)  
  1,22 (0,08) * 
 
1,55 (0,09) *** 
   1,08 (0,07)  
 
  2,17 (0,10) *** 
  1,54 (0,09) *** 
Education  
(ref.: No higher education) 
    Higher non-college 




    0,79 (0,06) *** 
    0,95 (0,06)  
 
 
  1,50 (0,05) *** 
  2,23 (0,05) *** 
 
 
    0,94 (0,07)    
    0,89 (0,07) 
 
 
1,58 (0,08) *** 
2,63 (0,08) *** 
 
 
  1,19 (0,06) ** 
  1,13 (0,07) ° 
 
 
1,62 (0,05) *** 
3,93 (0,06) *** 
 
 
  1,43 (0,09) *** 
  2,32 (0,09) *** 
Party  
(ref.: Flemish Nationalists) 
    Greens 
    Social democrats 
    Christian democrats 




15,97 (0,09) *** 
16,14 (0,07) *** 
  3,57 (0,05) *** 
    0,83 (0,13)  
 
 
   3,42 (0,08) *** 
   2,28 (0,05) *** 
   1,89 (0,05) *** 
   0,65 (0,11) *** 
 
 
2,73 (0,12) *** 
3,83 (0,10) *** 
0,43 (0,06) *** 
2,47 (0,20) *** 
 
 
6,91 (0,10) *** 
4,04 (0,09) *** 
2,67 (0,10) *** 
2,56 (0,19) *** 
 
 
11,29 (0,18) *** 
  3,01 (0,08) *** 
  1,36 (0,06) *** 
   0,91 (0,13)  
 
 
3,15 (0,08) *** 
2,08 (0,06) *** 
2,40 (0,06) *** 
1,77 (0,12) *** 
 
 
40,78 (0,16) *** 
24,18 (0,16) *** 
  6,75 (0,17) *** 
  5,18 (0,24) *** 
Female   0,83 (0,05) *** 0,89 (0,05) * 1,53 (0,07) ***     0,84 (0,07) *    1,08 (0,06)  0,50 (0,05) ***     0,97 (0,07)  
Constant    0,41 (0,05) *** 0,62 (0,05) * 3,94 (0,06) ***  0,03 (0,09) ***    2,60 (0,05) *** 0,65 (0,05) ***   0,01 (0,16) *** 
Nagelkerke’s R² 
 
0,34 0,10 0,14 0,12 0,09           0,16          0,28 
Note: Odd’s ratios (SE’s) of multiple logistic regressions; ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001





































Relation to party 
       
(ref.: Party member)        
   Central office staff     1,14 (0,20)    0,96 (0,20)     1,36 (0,27)    0,56 (0,29) *   1,61 (0,28) °    1,00 (0,21) 2,18 (0,23) ** 
   Parliamentary staff  
   Ministerial office staff 
 
    1,04 (0,19) 
    1,01 (0,15) 
   0,60 (0,17) ** 
   1,23 (0,15) 
    1,71 (0,29) * 
    1,22 (0,20) 
   0,35 (0,32) ** 
   0,41 (0,27) ** 
  1,61 (0,24) ° 
1,74 (0,20) ** 
   1,30 (0,21) 
   1,65 (0,17) ** 
1,87 (0,23) ** 
  2,11 (0,21) *** 
Age (ref.: 50+) 
    18-35     
    36-50 
 
 
    0,84 (0,09) ° 
    0,88 (0,07) ° 
 
1,34 (0,08) ** 
  1,51 (0,06) *** 
 
1,66 (0,12) *** 
1,35 (0,08) *** 
 
   1,06 (0,11) 
   1,16 (0,08) ° 
 
  1,04 (0,11)  
  1,21 (0,08) * 
 
1,55 (0,09) *** 
   1,08 (0,07)  
 
  2,18 (0,10) *** 
  1,55 (0,09) *** 
Education  
(ref.: No higher education) 
    Higher non-college 




    0,79 (0,06) *** 
    0,96 (0,06)  
 
 
  1,50 (0,05) *** 
  2,24 (0,05) *** 
 
 
    0,94 (0,07)    
    0,89 (0,07) 
 
 
1,58 (0,08) *** 
2,64 (0,08) *** 
 
 
  1,19 (0,06) ** 
  1,13 (0,07) ° 
 
 
1,62 (0,05) *** 
3,92 (0,06) *** 
 
 
  1,43 (0,09) *** 
  2,31 (0,09) *** 
Party  
(ref.: Flemish Nationalists) 
    Greens 
    Social democrats 
    Christian democrats 




15,94 (0,09) *** 
16,16 (0,07) *** 
  3,57 (0,05) *** 
    0,85 (0,13)  
 
 
   3,42 (0,08) *** 
   2,28 (0,05) *** 
   1,88 (0,05) *** 
   0,65 (0,11) *** 
 
 
2,73 (0,12) *** 
3,84 (0,10) *** 
0,43 (0,06) *** 
2,50 (0,20) *** 
 
 
6,88 (0,10) *** 
4,03 (0,09) *** 
2,68 (0,10) *** 
2,61 (0,19) *** 
 
 
11,29 (0,18) *** 
  3,01 (0,08) *** 
  1,36 (0,06) *** 
   0,91 (0,13)  
 
 
3,17 (0,08) *** 
2,09 (0,06) *** 
2,41 (0,06) *** 
1,74 (0,12) *** 
 
 
40,89 (0,16) *** 
24,21 (0,16) *** 
  6,77 (0,17) *** 
  5,35 (0,24) *** 
Female 
 
  0,82 (0,05) *** 0,89 (0,05) * 1,52 (0,07) ***     0,84 (0,07) *    1,08 (0,06)  0,50 (0,05) ***     0,96 (0,07)  
Constant    0,35 (0,10) *** 0,83 (0,09) * 6,51 (0,13) ***  0,04 (0,14) ***    2,70 (0,11) *** 1,01 (0,10) ***   0,01 (0,18) *** 
Nagelkerke’s R² 
 
0,34 0,10 0,14 0,12 0,09           0,16          0,28 
 
Note: Odd’s ratios (SE’s) of multiple logistic regressions; ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
